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Tender Offers by Controlling Shareholders:
The Specter of Coercion and Fair Price
A.C. Pritchard
INTRODUCTION
Taking your company private has never been so appealing. The collapse of
the tech bubble has left many companies whose stock prices bordered on the
stratospheric now trading at small fractions of their historical highs. The spate
of accounting scandals that followed the bursting of the bubble has taken some
of the shine off the aura of being a public company-the glare of the spotlight
from stock analysts and the business press looks much less inviting,
notwithstanding the monitoring benefits that the spotlight purports to confer.
Moreover, the regulatory backlash against those accounting scandals has made
the costs of being a public company higher than ever. The passage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 20021 has brought a host of costly new requirements for
public companies affecting both disclosure and corporate governance.
2
Securities fraud class actions are booming, 3 and rates for D&O insurance are
correspondingly skyrocketing.4 Auditors' fees have also spiked, reflecting the
greater expectations imposed on accountants to ferret out corporate
wrongdoing, and the commensurately greater risk of liability.5 Who needs it?
As it happens, Delaware has a fire sale on going private for one group that
might be particularly interested-controlling shareholders. In addition to the
risks enumerated above, corporations with controlling stakes in subsidiaries
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. I am grateful to participants at the
symposium on "The Role of Law in Promoting Long-term Value for Shareholders," sponsored by the
Berkeley Business Law Journal and the Mercatus Center (2003), as well as Mark West for helpful
comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
I. Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
2. Andrew Countryman, Law's Effects Pile up on Firms; Sarbanes-Oxley 's Internal Controls Rules
Prove Costly, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, July 20, 2003, at C1 (reporting increased compliance costs due to
law).
3. Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Case Filings, 2002: A Year in Review, available
at http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse research/2002_YIR2002_,ir.pdf (reporting 225 non-IPO
filings in 2002, a 31 percent increase relative to 2001).
4. Theo Francis, It Still Costs Big to Insure Against a Boardroom Scandal, WALL ST. J., July 31,
2003, at CI (reporting annual increases in the 25 percent to 30 percent range after premiums doubled or
tripled post-Enron).
5. OBSERVER COLUMN, FINANCIAL TIMES, July 17, 2003, at 12 ("Companies expect audit fees to
rise by a third.., according to a survey by Financial Executives International.").
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have to worry about the risk of derivative litigation on behalf of minority
shareholders. This risk arises from the fact that all of the controlling
shareholder's transactions with their controlled subsidiary are potentially
subject to the "entire fairness" standard, the most demanding regime in
corporate law.6 That same standard makes it difficult for controlling
shareholders to escape the risks of derivative lawsuits (and other costs of
holding a control bloc in a public subsidiary) because Delaware courts impose
the entire fairness standard on mergers between parent corporations and their
subsidiaries. 7 The result is that, until recently, freeze-out mergers to eliminate
minority shareholders have been procedurally complicated, expensive and a
target for litigation.
A recent series of cases from the Delaware courts, however, has blazed a
path for controlling shareholders to freeze out minority shareholders with
minimal procedural hurdles and commensurately minimal litigation risk. By
combining a tender offer to minority shareholders with a follow-up "short-
form" merger under Section 253 of the Delaware General Corporate Law,
controlling shareholders can eliminate minorities while avoiding the demanding
requirements of "entire fairness". 8 The attraction for controlling shareholders is
obvious, but is the tender offer/short-form alternative a good thing or a bad
thing for investors? The commentators to date have generally concluded that
minority shareholders are likely to be harmed. Alternatively, they claim that
this development undermines the doctrinal consistency of Delaware corporate
law by their inability to extract a greater premium from the controlling
shareholder. 9
This Article dissents from that consensus: my bottom line is that the
streamlined regime is likely to be positive for shareholders and that doctrinal
purity is not worth worrying about. To be sure, minority shareholders would
always prefer more to less in exchange for their shares, and the entire fairness
regime-and the elaborate procedural apparatus that it has spawned-might
generate more generous offers from controlling shareholders. But wealth
transfers between shareholders of subsidiary corporations and shareholders of
parent corporations are largely a social wash--one group's increased wealth
exactly offsets the other's diminished wealth. The risk of misappropriation will
be factored into the amount that investors will be willing to pay for a minority
stake, or into the premium necessary to obtain control. Requiring a second
control premium serves little useful purpose. Moreover, the most egregious
6. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v, Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
7. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (en banc).
8. See infra Part 1.
9. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, (Working Paper,
Columbia Law School), U. PA. L. Rav. (forthcoming 2004); Brian M. Resnick, Recent Delaware
Decisions May Prove to Be "Entirely Unfair " to Minority Shareholders in Parent Merger with Partially
Owned Subsidiary, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 253.
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over-reaching will be deterred by the need to encourage minority shareholders
to tender. On balance, less law is likely to produce more value for shareholders
in this context.
Of equal importance, from an institutional perspective, this streamlined
procedure is not a judicial innovation, but instead, well grounded in the overall
structure of Delaware corporate law. The entire fairness mandate is a
reasonable (if not inescapable) interpretation of the obligations imposed on
corporate boards by §251. There is no similar statutory mandate under §253,
nor is there any role prescribed for boards in connection with tender offers.
Consequently, the end run around the entire fairness regime threatens no new
incursion into the authority of corporate boards, the importance of which is
recognized by the business judgment rule. Moreover, the streamlined procedure
developed by the Delaware courts respects the careful balance between the
paramount role of the Delaware General Corporate Law and the interstitial role
of courts in spelling out the common law of fiduciary obligation. Fiduciary
obligation fills in the gaps of the corporate code-it is not intended to supplant
statutory law, or transform it into an "ideal" corporate law.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I sketches the "entire fairness"
regime, Part II traces the development of the tender offer/short-form alternative
and Part III addresses objections to that alternative. I summarize the main
points in a brief conclusion.
I. ENTIRE FAIRNESS
A. Application to Mergers
1. Weinberger
The general rule, long established in Delaware and elsewhere, is that
controlling shareholders owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation and minority
shareholders. This obligation requires that a parent company, when it engages
in "self-dealing" with its controlled subsidiary, demonstrate that the terms of
the transaction are entirely fair to the subsidiary.' 0 Not surprisingly, the
Delaware Supreme Court included mergers between the parent and subsidiary
in the category of "self-dealing" transactions when the issue arose in
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc." Although the defendant, Signal Companies,
attempted to shift the burden on the issue of entire fairness by making the
merger subject to approval by a majority of the minority shareholders, its
attempt failed because of its failure to disclose all material information to the
1O. Sinclair Oil Corp., 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
11. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
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minority. 12 Specifically, it failed to disclose a study by two UOP directors
(Arledge and Chitiea, who were also Signal directors) on the feasibility of a
buyout of UOP's minority shareholders. "Using UOP data, it described the
advantages to Signal of ousting the minority at a price range of $21 to $24 a
share."' 13 Given that the price offered in the merger was $21, the court
concluded that Signal's willingness to pay $24 would have been important
information for the minority shareholders confronted with the choice of either
voting for the merger or dissenting and seeking appraisal. 14 Obviously, this was
material to the minority shareholders, but the duty question was harder. Did
controlling shareholders have to reveal their reservation prices in all
circumstances? Did fairness require self-sacrifice by the majority shareholder?
Weinberger was ambiguous with respect to these questions.
Perhaps more significant than the court's holding, however, was a footnote
suggesting an alternative procedure:
Although perfection is not possible, or expected, the result here could have been
entirely different if UOP had appointed an independent negotiating committee of its
outside directors to deal with Signal at arm's length .... Since fairness in this
context can be equated to conduct by a theoretical, wholly independent, board of
directors acting upon the matter before them, it is unfortunate that this course
apparently was neither considered nor pursued .... Particularly in a parent-
subsidiary context, a showing that the action taken was as though each of the
contending parties had in fact exerted its bargaining power against the other at
arm's length is strong evidence that the transaction meets the test of fairness .... is
This footnote was a strong hint to transactional planners about the court's
preferred method for determining price in a freeze-out merger: arm's length
bargaining. Left unanswered, however, was a fundamental procedural question:
How strong would evidence of an arm's length bargain be in establishing
fairness? Would it be enough to secure the protections of the business judgment
rule?
2. Rosenblatt
The answer to the first question soon followed. Just two years later, in
Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., the court held that a majority shareholder need not
disclose its reservation price to establish the fairness ofa squeezeout:
While it has been suggested that Weinberger stands for the proposition that a
majority must under all circumstances disclose its top bid to the minority, that
clearly is a misconception of what we said there. The sole basis for our conclusions
in Weinberger regarding the non-disclosure of the Alredge-Chitica report was
because Signal appointed directors on UOP's board, who thus stood on both sides
of the transaction, violated their undiminished duty of loyalty to UOP. It had
12. Id. at 712.
13. Id. at 708.
14. Id. at 712.
15. Id. at 709 n.7.
Vol. 1:83, 2004
Tender Offers by Controlling Shareholders
nothing to with Signal's duty, as the majority stockholder, to the other shareholders
of UOP.
16
As clarified by Rosenblatt, the entire fairness regime established for mergers in
Weinberger stands for two rather unremarkable propositions. First, directors of
a subsidiary owe that firm a duty of undivided loyalty; allegiance to the parent
firm cannot dilute that bedrock duty. Second, the parent corporation cannot
expropriate assets from the subsidiary, such as the non-public information
contained in the Alredge-Chitiea report. It does not stand for the proposition
that all of the gains from the transaction must go to the minority.
3. McMullin
The importance of property and statutory rights in the entire fairness
analysis is reinforced by McMullin v. Beran.17 McMullin arose out of Atlantic
Richfield Company's ("ARCO") efforts to sell its 80 percent-owned subsidiary,
ARCO Chemical ("Chemical").' 8 ARCO was anxious to sell its stake in
Chemical to pay down debt accrued in financing the acquisition of another
subsidiary. 19 Chemical's board, recognizing that ARCO's 80 percent stake gave
it veto power over any transaction involving Chemical, delegated its authority
to negotiate the sale of the company to ARCO. 20 ARCO negotiated a deal with
Lyondell Petrochemical for a tender offer for Chemical shares at $57.75 per
share, to be followed by a second-step merger at the same price. 21 ARCO
committed to tendering its 80 percent stake into the tender offer, thus making
the deal, as it was presented to the Chemical board, essentially a fail
accompli.22 The Chemical board could withhold its consent, but Lyondell
could override that refusal after it acquired ARCO's stake by replacing the
Chemical board.
Notwithstanding the reality of ARCO's voting power over Chemical, the
Delaware Supreme Court concluded that the Chemical board had breached its
fiduciary duty to the minority by failing "to make an informed and independent
decision on whether to recommend approval of the third-party transaction with
Lyondell to the minority shareholders." 23 This fiduciary duty arose out of the
"statutory duty imposed under 8 Del. C. § 251 'to act in an informed and
deliberate manner in determining whether to approve an agreement of merger
before submitting the proposal to the stockholders.'
24
16. 493 A.2d 929, 939 (Del. 1985).
17. 765 A.2d 910 (Del. 2000).
18. Id. at 914.
19. Id. at 921.
20. Id. at915.
21. Id. at916.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 924.
24. Id. at 917 (quoting Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985)).
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Form matters here. ARCO clearly could have sold its 80 percent stake-for
whatever price it could negotiate-without any involvement from the Chemical
board. The Chemical board would have had no role to play in those
negotiations. By instead negotiating an acquisition agreement that required the
Chemical board's assent under § 251 because of the agreed-upon follow-up
merger, ARCO implicated the Chemical board's duty to recommend only
value-maximizing offers to the Chemical shareholders.
25
One caveat is worth noting here: if ARCO had required concessions from
its subsidiary, the Chemical board's fiduciary duties might have been
implicated in connection with the sale of only its stock. For example, in In re
Digex, Inc. Shareholders Litigation,26 the board of the subsidiary breached its
fiduciary duties by agreeing to waive the protections of § 203 in connection
with the merger of its parent corporation. Digex follows closely from
Weinberger (and for that matter, Sinclair): rights held by the subsidiary
corporation (whether conferred by common law or statute) are to be exercised
for the benefit of the subsidiary, not the parent. The subsidiary must receive fair
consideration for waiving those rights.
B. Procedures
1. Kahn
The answer to the procedural question left open in Weinberger took longer
to resolve. In Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems, the Delaware Supreme
Court held that "approval of the transaction by an independent committee of
directors or an informed majority of minority shareholders shifts the burden of
proof on the issue of fairness from the controlling or dominating shareholder to
the challenging shareholder plaintiff., 27 The court also held, however, that
whatever the procedures adopted to protect the minority, the business judgment
rule standard would not apply to a merger with a controlling shareholder;
rather, the standard would remain entire fairness. 28 The court justified its
refusal to confer business judgment protection because of the perceived risk of
potential retaliation by the majority:
Even where no coercion is intended, shareholders voting on a parent subsidiary
merger might perceive that their disapproval could risk retaliation of some kind by
the controlling stockholder. For example, the controlling stockholder might decide
to stop dividend payments or to effect a subsequent cash out merger at a less
25- Id. at 920 (noting that sale of entire company, "rather than selling only its own 80 percent
interest," implicated Revlon duties).
26. 789 A.2d 1176 (Del. Ch. 2000).
27. 638A.2d 1110, 1117(Del. 1994).
28. But see Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.61(b)(1)-(2) (altering standard to business judgment when
merger is negotiated by an independent special committee or ratified by an informed minority).
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favorable 2 price, for which the remedy would be time consuming and costly
litigation.
The refusal to shift the standard from entire fairness to business judgment was
significant because of the incentives it gave to the plaintiffs' bar. Not only did
the court refuse business judgment protection for the work of special
committees, but it also mandated "careful judicial scrutiny of a special
committee's real bargaining power before shifting the burden of proof on the
issue of entire fairness., 30 Consequently, application of the entire fairness
standard, even if the controlling shareholder was likely to eventually prevail,
"normally will preclude dismissal of a complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss."31 A claim that can withstand a motion to dismiss may have settlement
value, if only to avoid the expense of discovery. After Kahn, it would be the
rare freezeout that would not generate a lawsuit, no matter how scrupulously
negotiated. The controlling shareholder might prevail, even if less than
scrupulous (as the defendant eventually did in Kahn),32 but not without the risk
of delay and uncertainty.
33
II. TENDER OFFER/SHORT-FORM MERGER
A. The Supreme Court Shows the Shortcut to Squeezeout
Transactional planners were quick to exploit an alternative freeze-out path
by combining the holdings of two more recent Delaware Supreme Court
decisions: Solomon v. Pathe Communications Corp.34 and Glassman v. Unocal
Exploration Corp.35 To many observers, the combined import of these two
holdings threatened to vitiate the protections of the entire fairness standard as
applied in Weinberger.
1. Solomon
Solomon involved an unusual takeover, in that Credit Lyonnais Banque
Nederland N.V. ("the bank") was poised to gain its controlling interest not
through the purchase of shares, but rather through foreclosure on an 89.5
29. Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems, Inc., 638 A.2d, I110, 1116 (Del. 1994) (quoting
Citron v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490, 502 (Del. Ch. 1990)).
30- ld. at 1117.
31. Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5,20 n.36 (Del. Ch. 2002).
32. Kahn, 669 A.2d 79 (Del. 1995) (affirming chancery court's conclusion that merger was entirely
fair to the minority despite "coercive" threats made by majority shareholder to special committee).
33. See William T. Allen et al, Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in
Delaware Corporation Law, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 859, 880-81 (2001) (criticizing failure to give business
judgment protection to transactions approved by a majority of the minority).
34. 672 A.2d 35 (Del. 1996).
35. 777 A.2d 242 (Del. 2001).
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percent block of Pathe shares in which it held a security interest.3 6 In
conjunction with this foreclosure, however, the bank proposed a tender offer
for the 10.5 percent of the shares held by the public. 37 Plaintiff-shareholders
sought to enjoin the tender offer as both unfair and coercive.38
The Delaware Supreme Court made short work of both claims. As to the
claims of unfair price, the court curtly replied that "in the absence of coercion
or disclosure violations, the adequacy of price in a voluntary tender offer
cannot be an issue."39 The court also discerned no factual basis in the complaint
for the allegation of coercion.40 Accordingly, it affirmed the Chancery Court's
dismissal of the complaint on a 12(b)(6) motion.
2. Glassman
Glassman raised an entire fairness challenge to a merger by a controlling
shareholder. It differed in one crucial respect, however, from the mergers
subjected to the entire fairness standard in Weinberger, Rosenbiatt, and Kahn.
Unlike those cases, which involved mergers under Delaware's section 251, the
merger in Glassman was to proceed under § 253 of that code, the "short-form"
merger provision. 41 Unlike § 251, which requires the approval of both the board
and shareholders of the subsidiary, a merger pursuant to § 253 can be
implemented unilaterally by the board of the parent company if it owns at least
4290 percent of the subsidiary's shares. It does, however, allow minority
shareholders to seek appraisal under all circumstances (unlike mergers under §
251, which are subject to § 262's complicated "market out" provision).4 3
The Glassman court found that the differences between § 251 and § 253
were fatal to the plaintiffs' entire fairness claim:
If a corporate fiduciary follows the truncated process authorized by § 253, it will
not be able to establish the fair dealing prong of entire fairness. If, instead, the
corporate fiduciary sets up a negotiating committee, hires independent financial and
36. Solomon, 672 A.2d at 37.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 40. The chancery court had reached a similar conclusion previously in In re Ocean
Drilling & Exploration Company Shareholders Litigation, 1991 WL 70028, at *3 (1991) (concluding
that "as a general principle our law holds that a controlling shareholder extending an offer for minority-
held shares in the controlled corporation is under no obligation, absent evidence that material
information about the offer has been withheld or misrepresented or that the offer is coercive in some
significant way, to offer any particular price for the minority-held stock.") and in Joseph v- Shell Oil
Co., 482 A.2d 335, 343 (1984) (distinguishing Weinberger as involving a merger rather than a tender
offer).
40. Id. at 40
41. Glassman, 777 A.2d at 243.
42. DEL. CODE. ANN. Tit. 8, § 253,
43. Compare tit. 8, § 253(d) (providing that "the stockholders of the subsidiary Delaware
corporation party to the merger shall have appraisal rights as set forth in Section 262") with Del. C.
§ 262(b) (providing various exceptions to right to appraisal for mergers under § 251).
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legal experts, etc., then it will have lost the very benefit provided by the statute-a
simple, fast and inexpensive process for accomplishing a merger. We resolve this
conflict by giving effect to the intent of the General Assembly. In order to serve its
purpose,.§ 253 must be construed to obviate the requirement to establish entire
fairness.
The court qualified its holding by noting that the determination of fair value
which would be available in an appraisal proceeding would incorporate many
of the issues that would be raised in an entire fairness proceeding seeking
equitable relief.45 It also noted that the controlling shareholder's duty of full
disclosure carried over to the short-form merger context, mandating that
minority shareholders "be given all the factual information that is material to
that decision., 46 Nonetheless, the procedural burdens imposed by Kahn were
cast aside for controlling shareholders who held at least 90 percent of the
subsidiary's stock. The only requirement was full disclosure.
B. Combining Tender Offers and Short-Form Mergers
Transactional planners were quick to recognize that combining the tender
offer used in Solomon with the short-form merger used in Glassman could
effect a squeezeout of minority shareholders with no entire fairness review. A
trio of decisions from the Chancery Court (decided by three different vice-
chancellors) have blessed the two-step path to a freezeout, although they have
varied in their enthusiasm.
1. Siliconix
The first case in this trilogy, In re Siliconix Inc. Shareholders Litigation,
47
arose out of a tender offer by Vishay Intertechnology for the 19.6 percent of the
Siliconix shares that it did not already own. At the time that it announced its
tender offer, Vishay also disclosed that it would "consider" a follow-on short-
form merger at the same price if it acquired over 90 percent of Siliconix
stock.48 The Siliconix board responded to the tender offer by appointing a
special committee (of dubious independence) to evaluate the offer of $28.82
cash per share.49 The special committee advised Vishay that it considered the
offer inadequate. 50 After some effort at negotiating a possible merger with the
special committee, Vishay dropped its cash offer and substituted an exchange
44. Glassman, 777 A.2d at 247-48 (footnotes omitted).
45. Id. at 248.
46. Id.
47. 2001 WL 716787, at *1 (Del. Ch. 2001). Vishay had acquired its 80.4 percent stake from
Daimler-Benz in 1998. Id.
48. Id. at *2.
49. The court noted that "Both members of the Special Committee had done extensive work with
Vishay," one as its attorney and the other as its banker. Id.
50. Id. at *3.
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offer of one and a half shares of Vishay stock for each share of Siliconix.5 ' This
exchange offer, unlike the previous cash offer, included no premium over the
market price for Siliconix shares. Despite the somewhat niggardly price, the
exchange offer did contain "a non-waivable 'majority of the minority'
provision providing that Vishay would not proceed with its tender offer unless
a majority of those shareholders not affiliated with Vishay tendered their
shares."5 3 Vishay's exchange offer (like the earlier cash offer) did not,
however, include a commitment to a follow-on short-form merger.
54
Not surprisingly, the offer provoked one of the minority shareholders to file
a lawsuit seeking to enjoin the transaction. In addition to a litany of alleged
disclosure violations, the plaintiff alleged that the exchange ratio did not reflect
a fair price for the Siliconix shares. Following the holding in Solomon, Vice-
Chancellor Noble concluded that:
Vishay was under no duty to offer any particular price, or a "fair" price, to the
minority shareholders of Siliconix unless actual coercion or disclosure violations
are shown by [the plaintiffl. In short, as long as the tender offer is pursued properly,
the free choice of the minority shareholders to reject the tender offer provides
sufficient protection.
55
The court acknowledged the incongruity of allowing Vishay to proceed with
the tender offer/short-form merger combination with minimal judicial scrutiny
while a one-step freeze-out merger under § 251 would be subjected to entire
fairness review, given that both paths would lead to the same result. 6 The vice-
chancellor offered two justifications for the differences in judicial scrutiny.
First, the shareholder who rejects the tender offer would still hold his shares,
even though they might be taken in the subsequent short-form merger.
5 7
Second, the tender offer spurred no "corporate decision" as a merger would
have "because the actual target of a tender is not the corporation (or its
directors), but, instead, is its shareholders."5 8 The bottom line is that Vishay
stood on the opposite side of the transaction from the Siliconix shareholders,
not the Siliconix corporation. Vishay had no control over those shareholders,
who had the power to thwart the transaction by refusing to tender, so entire
fairness was not triggered.5 9 Vishay's only affirmative obligation as a
controlling shareholder (in addition to its passive duty to avoid coercive
51. ld at *4.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at *6.
56. Id. at *7.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at *8 (rejecting entire fairness review because "[h]ere, the Siliconix minority shareholders
have the power to thwart the tender offer because it will go forward only if a majority of the minority
shares are tendered").
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threats) was a duty of full disclosure of all material facts to the minority. 6' The
court followed precedent without additional discussion of rejecting the claim
that Vishay's failure to commit to a short-form merger was actionable
coercion.
61
The fact that the shareholders, rather than the target corporation, were
called upon to make a decision also had important implications for the duties of
the Siliconix board. Responding to the plaintiffs argument that the Siliconix
board had a duty under McMullin to advise the minority shareholders on
whether they should tender their shares, the vice-chancellor emphasized the
lack of a statutory role for the board in tender offers which contrasted with the
mandate imposed on the board under § 251 to make a recommendation to
shareholders. 62 The minority shareholders were left to their own devices in
responding to Vishay's tender offer.
2. Aquila
In re Aquila, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, like Siliconix, involved a tender
offer by an 80 percent shareholder (in this case UtiliCorp) for the shares of the
minority. 63 Unlike Siliconix, however, Utilicorp committed to doing a short-
form merger if its tender offer resulted in it obtaining 90 percent of Aquila's
shares. 64 This left the plaintiffs without a claim that the offer was coercive.
Undeterred, the plaintiffs argued that they were deprived of the procedural
protection of a recommendation on the tender offer by an independent board.
Aquila had failed to honor its commitment made at the time of its IPO to
appoint two independent directors to its five-member board.65 Consequently,
the conflicted members of the Aquila board declined to make a
recommendation on UtiliCorp's offer. Instead, they solicited an analysis of the
offer by an independent investment bank, which was provided to the Aquila
minority. 66 The board did not, however, request a fairness opinion from the
investment bank.67 Following the ruling in Siliconix, the court concluded that
the Aquila board had no obligation to provide an evaluation of the fairness of
the transaction. 68 There was little evidence that the views of independent
directors would make a difference to the minority shareholders. The court
60. Id. at *9.
61. Id. at * 16.
62. Id. at *8.
63. 805 A.2d 184, 186 (Del. Ch. 2002).
64. Id. at 188.
65. Id. This commitment was required by the listing rules of the NYSE, where Aquila stock traded,
and was reflected in Aquila's certificate of incorporation. Id. at 188 n.I (citing N.Y.S.E. LISTED Co.
MANUAL § 303.02(D).
66 Id. at 189.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 191.
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explained:
The offer being made by UtiliCorp is structured in a non-coercive way and the
stockholders of Aquila appear to have adequate information and time to make an
informed and reasoned decision whether or not to tender. While the presence of a
functioning audit committee of independent directors might add some measure of
protection for the Aquila stockholders, I cannot conclude that its absence is clear
and convincing evidence of an injustice ... even if those two new directors were to
conclude that the UtiliCorp offer is unfairly priced, they could do little more than
communicate their conclusion to the stockholders in the Schedule 14D-9 and
recommend that they not tender.... In the end, those stockholders would still have
to decide for themselves whether to tender or not and would still have the collective
power to reject the offer.69
Aquila, therefore, reaffirms Siliconix's faith in the ability of shareholders to
fend for themselves.
3. Pure Resources
The smooth sailing to squeeze out validated in Siliconix and Aquila ran into
rougher weather in In re Pure Resources Inc. Shareholders Litigation.70 Unlike
Siliconix and Aquila, in which the courts were content to allow the tender offers
to proceed with minimal scrutiny, Vice-Chancellor Leo Strine held forth at
length on a variety of topics in Delaware corporate law that he considered
relevant to the legality of tender offers by controlling shareholders. In the end,
however, he somewhat grudgingly allowed the offer to proceed subject to only
minor modifications.
The offer under review was Unocal's exchange offer for the 35 percent of
Pure Resources' shares that it did not already own. 71 Like the Siliconix and
Aquila offers, Unocal conditioned its offer on approval by a majority of the
minority. And like the offer in Aquila, Unocal committed itself to a short-
form merger at the same price if it obtained 90 percent of Pure Resources'
shares. 73 The facts alleged in Pure Resources differed from Siliconix and
Aquila in two important aspects: (1) the Pure Resources management was
generally hostile to Unocal's bid; and (2) the Pure Resources board appointed
an energetic special committee that gave Unocal's offer a very hard look.
Pure Resources had been formed as the result of the combination of
Unocal's oil and gas operations in the Permian Basin (located in western Texas
and southeastern New Mexico) with Titan Exploration, an independent oil and
gas company operating in the same area. 74 Titan's managers stayed on to run
69. Id. at 194.
70. 808 A.2d 421 (Del. Ch. 2002).
71. Id. at 425.
72. Id. at 430.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 425.
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Pure Resources, but the relationship between Unocal and Pure Resources'
management proved to be prickly. 75 More importantly, in the context of
Unocal's tender offer, management held a quarter of the Pure Resources' shares
not owned by Unocal.76 Consequently, Unocal's tender offer faced tough
sledding if it did not appeal to this bloc. 77 Moreover, it is difficult to imagine
that Unocal had any informational advantage over Pure Resources'
management in pricing Pure Resources' stock-a recurring worry in tender
offers by controlling shareholders. Therefore, the presence of a hostile
management bloc made Pure Resources an unlikely case for raising concerns
about a "coerced" minority.
Minority shareholders could take further comfort from the fact that the
special committee appointed by Pure Resources was not content to merely roll
over in the face of Unocal's offer. Instead, the special committee sought "the
full authority of the board under Delaware law to respond to the offer."78 Such
authority would have provided the committee not only the power to negotiate,
but also would have added teeth to its negotiating position: the full authority of
the board would presumably include the ability to adopt a poison pill and to
thwart Unocal's offer. 79 The full board (including the Unocal designees on the
board) rebuffed this request by the special committee. Despite this limitation on
the authority, the special committee attempted to extract a higher price from
Unocal, but to no avail.8° In the face of Unocal's recalcitrance, the special
committee voted to recommend against Unocal's offer; this recommendation
was conveyed to Pure Resources' shareholders in the company's Schedule
14D-9.8'
The special committee's recommendation against tendering into the offer
did not satisfy the plaintiff-minority shareholder, who sought to enjoin the
tender offer from proceeding. Given the factual similarities to Siliconix and
Aquila, those precedents would have provided a relatively straightforward basis
for refusing the injunction. Vice-Chancellor Strine, however, seized the
opportunity provided by the proceeding to hold forth on a wide-ranging series
of issues in Delaware takeover law. The duty of judges, as the vice-chancellor
saw it, was to craft "equitable principles sufficient to protect against abuse and
unfairness, but not so rigid as to stifle useful transactions that could increase the
shareholder and societal wealth generated by the corporate form." 82 A lofty
75. Id at 427.
76. Id. at 425.
77. At the time of the lawsuit, management had announced that it did not intend to tender its shares.
Id. at 452.
78. Id. at 430.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 432.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 434.
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goal, indeed.
Strine was troubled by the "possible incoherence" in treating "economically
similar transactions as categorically different simply because the method by
which controlling stockholder proceeds varies."-83 Minority shareholders were
just as squeezed out after tender offers followed by short-form mergers under
§ 253 as they were after mergers between subsidiaries and controlling
shareholders under § 251. So why treat the transactions differently? Worse yet,
the judge felt the threat to minority shareholders was arguably greater in the
tender offer/short form merger transaction. The vice-chancellor remarked:
In a merger vote, stockholders can vote no and still receive the transactional
consideration if the merger prevails. In a tender offer, however, a non-tendering
shareholder individually faces an uncertain fate. That stockholder could be one of
the few who holds out, leaving herself in an even more thinly traded stock with little
hope of liquidity and subject to a § 253 merger at a lower price, or at the same price
but at a later (and, given the time value of money, a less valuable) time. The 14D-9
warned Pure's minority shareholders of just this possibility. For these reasons, some
view tender offers as creating a prisoner's dilemma - distorting choice and creating
incentives for stockholders to tender into offers that they believe are inadequate in
order to avoid a worse fate.
84
Thus, the specter of coercion made the shareholders' decision to tender their
shares suspect as an indicia of the fairness of the offer.
Strine was also troubled by another disparity in Delaware's corporate law:
tender offers by controlling shareholders were subject to relatively hands-off
treatment, while tender offers by third parties justified the invocation by target
boards of the full gamut of corporate defenses. 85 This issue had heightened
salience in Pure Resources in light of the special committee's rebuffed efforts
to be delegated authority to adopt a poison pill. Despite the lack of a statutory
role for boards of directors in responding to tender offers, the Delaware
Supreme Court had recognized an "affirmative duty" for directors of companies
confronted with tender offers. 86 Strine focused on this language from that
court's seminal decision validating defensive measures against hostile
takeovers, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.:
[T]he board's power to act derives from its fundamental duty and obligation to
protect the corporate enterprise, which includes stockholders, from harm reasonably
perceived, irrespective of its source. Thus, we are satisfied that in the broad context
of corporate governance, including issues of fundamental corporate change, a board
of directors is not a passive instrumentality."
87
83. Id. at 435.
84. Id. at441-42.
85. Id. at 444 ("As a general matter, Delaware law permits directors substantial leeway to block the
access of stockholders to receive substantial premium tender offers made by third-parties by use of the
poison pill but provides relatively free access to minority stockholders to accept buy-out offers from
controlling stockholders.").
86. !d. at 440.
87. Id. (quoting Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)) (emphasis
Strine's).
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Why then, should the board of a controlled subsidiary be a "passive
instrumentality" when confronted by a tender offer from the controlling
shareholder, the position seemingly endorsed by Siliconix and Aquila?88 Did
the undiluted fiduciary duty of a subsidiary's board 89 require the directors to
adopt a poison pill to give minority shareholders' bargaining leverage in the
face of a tender offer by a controlling shareholder? On the one hand, such a
mandate would have given minority shareholders the ability to extract higher
prices in freezeouts. On the other, it would have gutted the advantages of the
tender offer/short-form merger path to squeeze out for controlling shareholders.
Controlling shareholders might hesitate to make such offers as a consequence,
and ex ante, reluctant to become controlling shareholders at all.
The plaintiffs squarely put this issue to the court. They argued that the Pure
Resources board's rejection of the special committee's request for the authority
to adopt a poison pill was subject to the entire fairness standard because Unocal
controlled the board. 90 The court declined the plaintiffs' invitation, despite what
it termed the "analytical and normative appeal, embodying as it does the rough
fairness of the goose and gander rule." 9' The court's rationale, however, was
somewhat tenuous: it was "reluctant ... to burden the common law of
corporations with a new rule that would tend to compel the use of a device that
our statutory law only obliquely sanctions and that in other contexts is subject
to misuse, especially when used to block a high value bid that is not structurally
coercive. ' '92 The court's reluctance stemmed from the "awkwardness of a legal
rule requiring a board to take aggressive action against a structurally non-
coercive offer by the controlling stockholder that elects it." 93
"Awkwardness" is less than compelling as a justification for avoiding the
protections of entire fairness. Moreover, it is difficult to characterize the
Delaware Supreme Court's treatment of defensive measures as only obliquely
sanctioning them, though the attitudes of some members of the court of
chancery may be less favorable. The vice-chancellor's distinction of Digex, in
which the subsidiary board was held to have breached its fiduciary duty by
waiving the anti-takeover protections of § 203,94 is similarly shaky. According
88. Id. at 443 (noting "an... obvious concern is that subsidiary directors might use the absence of
a statutory role for them in the tender offer process to be less than aggressive in protecting minority
interests, to wit, the edifying examples of subsidiary directors courageously taking no position on the
merits of offers by a controlling stockholder").
89. Cf. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. 457 A.2d 717, 710 (Del. 1983) ("There is no dilution [of the
obligation of fiduciary duty] where one holds dual or multiple directorships, as in a parent-subsidiary
context. Thus, individuals who act in a dual capacity as directors of two corporations, one of whom is
parent and the other subsidiary, owe the same duty of good management to both corporations.
90. Cf. Pure Resources, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 808 A.2d at 446 (Del. Ch. 2002).
91. Id.
92, Id
93. Id.
94. 789 A.2d 1176 (Del. Ch. 2000). See also McMullin, 765 A.2d 910, 917 (Del. 2000).
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to the court, in Digex "the controlling stockholder forced the subsidiary board
to take action only beneficial to it, whereas here the Pure board simply did not
interpose itself between Unocal's offer and the Pure minority." 95 This rationale
rings a bit hollow in light of the fact that the special committee had attempted
to interpose itself, but was rebuffed by the Unocal-dominated board. Was not
the refusal of the Pure Resources board to give the special committee authority
to adopt the poison pill "action only beneficial to" Unocal? Overall, the court's
rejection of the entire fairness argument put forth by the plaintiffs is a bit thin.
Perhaps a more candid (but no more intellectually satisfying) response to
the plaintiffs' argument would have been the constraint on a lower court of the
combined import of the Delaware Supreme Court's decisions in Solomon and
Glassman. While those cases are not squarely controlling on this point, a lower
court could be forgiven for reading the direction that the wind was blowing in
the court above. The "just say no" authority to thwart the advances of a
controlling shareholder sought by the special committee in Pure Resources is
the benchmark of fair dealing under Kahn,96 and Solomon and Glassman are
clearly a turn away from that regime.
Rather than risk reversal, the Pure Resources court endeavored to satisfy its
concerns within the "non-coercive" doctrinal framework established by
Solomon. Vice-Chancellor Strine imposed three requirements intended to
ensure that the tender offer was non-coercive:
1)... a non-waivable majority of the minority tender condition;
2) the controlling stockholder promises to consummate a prompt § 253 merger at
the same price if it obtains more than 90 percent of the shares; and
3) the controlling stockholder has made no retributive threats.97
Applying these principles to the case at hand, the court found that Unocal had
failed the first prong by failing to exclude Pure Resources' management from
98the definition of the minority and enjoined the offer until it was revised.
4. The Definition of Non-Coercion
The last of the Pure Resources requirements is an uncontroversial criterion
for non-coercion, but the first two are less obvious. The first objection to them
is obvious: both of these protections could be provided contractually, so should
judges supply them when parties do not?
A contractarian answer has appeal in this setting. Consider how minority
shareholders got to be minority shareholders. There are two primary avenues.
95. Pure Resources, 808 A.2d at 446 n.49 (citing Digex, 789 A.2d 1176 (Del. Ch. 2000)).
96. Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems, Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1119-20 (Del. 1994)
(emphasizing that special committee negotiating a merger with a controlling shareholder must have
"power to say no").
97. Pure Resources, 808 A.2d at 445.
98. Id. at 446-47.
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The first is a public offering by a parent company doing an equity carveout of a
subsidiary. It does not take a zealous faith in the efficient capital market
hypothesis to see that the risks of appropriation by the controlling shareholder
will lead investors to discount the value of shares in a company that has a
dominant shareholder. This discount, of course, comes out of the pocket of the
controlling shareholder, who will receive less for the shares that it sells in the
public offering. If the discount is too great, the controlling shareholder will take
steps to reduce discounting by ensuring minority shareholders receive adequate
protection in the event of a subsequent freezeout. Such a risk is surely obvious
enough that investors will take it into account in valuing the securities.
The second principal path to becoming a minority shareholder is as a result
of a third-party tender offer for a majority, but less than all, of the shares. The
target board, armed with the bargaining leverage of the poison pill, surely has a
role to play in securing protections for shareholders whose stock will not be
taken up in the tender offer. Extracting procedural protections for those soon-
to-be minority shareholders is entirely consistent with the target board's Revlon
* duties. 99 In the post-Solomon/Glassman world, directors of target boards would
do well to take such concerns into account when negotiating with potential
acquirors.100 Alternatively, the board can insist on a higher premium from
acquirers seeking less than any and all shares. All of the shareholders would be
entitled to share in that initial premium on a pro rata basis.
Even if one thinks that judges should play a more active role in protecting
shareholders who (or whose bargaining agents) have neglected to protect
themselves, the Pure Resources non-coercive criteria seem less than
compelling. The requirement of a majority of the minority seems largely
superfluous-why would a controlling shareholder offer an amount less than
what it would expect to produce a majority of the minority's shares? The
tender offer itself is not free, and simply increasing its percentage ownership of
the company offers few benefits to a controlling shareholder. Only if it reaches
the magic number of 90 percent will there be a concrete benefit, i.e., the ability
to do a short-form merger and take the company private, which should generate
cost savings. The controlling shareholders in Siliconix and Aquila each owned
80 percent of the shares-they needed a majority of the minority to get the 90
percent needed to do the short-form merger. A majority of the minority would
have done little for Unocal-it needed slightly more than 71 percent of the 35
percent of the Pure Resources stock that it did not already own to reach the
crucial 90 percent threshold.101
99. See Paramount Communications v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34 (Del- 1994) (suggesting that a
poison pill could be used to extract protections for soon-to-be minority shareholders).
100. It is possible, one supposes, to acquire a controlling bloc through open-market transactions.
The poison pill, however, would appear an insuperable barrier to this takeover strategy.
101. See Donald J. Wolfe, Jr., The Odd Couple: Majority of Minority Approval and the Tender
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As a strategic matter, any offer that does not include a condition that the
offeror obtain 90 percent of the shares sends a strong signal that the offeror
believes that there is a good chance that it will be rebuffed, i.e., it is a low-ball
offer. An investor does not need to be an investment professional to recognize
that an offer lacking such a condition should be rejected. To be sure, some
firms will hold closer to 90 percent and may be able to proceed with less than a
majority of the minority; but those firms are likely to find it cheaper to buy
what they need in open-market transactions, so even the Pure Resources
criteria would be inapplicable.
This line of analysis also suggests that the requirement of a commitment to
do a § 253 merger is also redundant. Moreover, other courts have not seen that
as necessary to ensure non-coercion. Recall that the controlling shareholder did
not commit to a § 253 merger in Siliconix, but the court there did not conclude
that made the offer coercive.' 0 2 For that matter, the controlling shareholder did
not commit to a follow-on merger in Solomon, although the issue is not
discussed by the court. The shares of the subsidiary left outstanding were
subsequently delisted by the NYSE.'0 3 The failure to follow up the tender offer
with a merger will undoubtedly cause the shares to lose value (particularly if
they are delisted), but it does not follow that it makes the tender offer coercive.
Will the diminution be sufficient to cause a shareholder to tender into an
undervalued offer? They will, after all, continue to hold their shares and have a
pro rata claim on any earnings distribution. Is that claim worth more or less
than a low-ball offer by the controlling shareholder? These are, however,
largely quibbles. Controlling shareholders will not be burdened unduly by the
Pure Resources criteria in most cases. The bottom line for transactional
planners is that the tender offer/short-form merger combination provides a
ready means for evading the entire fairness regime imposed on controlling
shareholders doing mergers under § 251.
III. OBJECTIONS
The Solomon/Glassman circumvention of the entire fairness standard has
obvious procedural benefits and cost savings, but it has, nonetheless, provoked
the usual outpouring of complaints about the potential for its abuse. Those
Offer, 6 M & A LAWYER 6 n.26 (2002) (majority of minority provision was "intended solely for the
benefit of the controlling stockholder itself to ensure ultimate ownership of at least 90% of the
outstanding shares and the attending capacity to effect a short form merger without further fuss or ado.
This condition was labeled a majority of the minority approval condition rather than a minimum shares
condition by a clever lawyer seeking, successfully it would appear, to suggest an equitable motive for an
otherwise obviously self serving provision").
102. Siliconix, 2001 WL 716787, at *16. See also In re Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co.
Shareholders Litig., 1991 WL 70028 (Del. Ch. 1991) (finding no "actionable coercion" in failure to
commit to a subsequent merger).
103. Commission file number 0-12252, Pathe Communications 10-K, Dec. 31, 1992.
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complaints fit generally into two categories echoing the concerns expressed by
Vice-Chancellor Strine in Pure Resources: coercion and fair price. I deal with
each of these objections in turn.
A. Coercion
The most frequent complaint about Solomon/Glassman and their progeny is
that the standards set forth by the Delaware courts for tender offers for
controlling shareholders will not protect investors from coercion.10 4 This
specter of coercion, it is said, removes any assurance that the acceptance by
minority shareholders of the tender offer reliably indicates that they consider
the price to be reasonable. Shareholders will tender even at lowball prices, the
argument goes, rather than face an uncertain future as a minority shareholder of
a still smaller minority, facing possible delisting with its attendant loss of
liquidity. Even if the controlling shareholder proceeds with a § 253 merger, it
will come at later time and, potentially, a lower price. For those declining the
merger price, opting for appraisal ensures even more uncertainty and delay.
0 5
Some commentators go further, claiming that all tender offers are coercive. 106
The claim that even a fully-informed minority can be coerced into
accepting offers by controlling shareholders certainly has a theoretical appeal to
those inclined to find oppression at every turn. Unfortunately, it runs afoul of
empirical reality: minority shareholders are not readily buffaloed into accepting
a lowball offer. Consider the tender offers in the cases discussed above. Vishay
won its battle in court, but lost the war when less than a majority of the
Siliconix minority shareholders tendered their shares.1° 7 Siliconix continues as
a public company today. l08 Unocal succeeded with its tender offer for Pure
Resources, 10 9 but only after offering a more generous exchange ratio to the
Pure Resources minority, which induced the Pure Resources board (and
management) to recommend the offer." 0 At the time Unocal raised its offer,
only 450,404 shares had been tendered, representing 2.6 percent of the shares
104. See, e.g., Kimble C. Cannon, Augmenting the Duties of Directors to Protect Minority
Shareholders in the Context of Going-Private Transactions: The Case for Obligating Directors to
Express a Valuation Opinion in Unilateral Tender Offers after Siliconix, Aquila and Pure Resources,
2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 191, 196-7 ("[T]he line of Delaware cases permitting director inaction in
connection with unilateral tender offers also legitimizes as non-coercive a class of tender offer
transaction that leaves shareholders no practical choice but to accept an offer's terms.").
105. Id. at 242.
106. Bradley R. Aronstam et al, Delaware's Going-Private Dilemma: Fostering Protections for
Minority Shareholders in the Wake of Siliconix and Unocal Exploration, 58 Bus. LAW. 519 (2003).
107. Olaf de Senerpoint Domis, Vishay bid for Siliconix quashed, DAILY DEAL, July 6, 2001,
(reporting that offer expired with only 40 percent of shares tendering).
108. Commission File Number 0-3692 Siliconix, Inc. 10-Q (May 12, 2003)-
109. Unocal Successful in Exchange Offerfor Pure Resources, PR NEWSWIRE, Oct. 30, 2002.
110. Pure Resources Decides to Accept Final Amended Buyout Offer from Unocal, PETROLEUM
FIN. WEEK, October 14, 2002; Unocal Increases Exchange Ratio of Exchange Offer for Pure Resources
Shares, PR NEWSWIRE, Oct. 2, 2002.
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held by the minority."' Apparently the 97.4 percent that held out for a better
offer did not understand that they had no choice but to tender. Only in the third
case of the trilogy-Aquila--did the controlling shareholder succeed with its
tender offer without raising its bid. 112 Other controlling shareholders have faced
similar resistance." 3 In the choices that we commonly think of as coercive-
"Your money or your life"-a considerably lower percentage dare to risk the
imposition of the coercive sanction.
What do these investors know that lawyers and law professors do not?
Perhaps it is that the "coercive" threat posed by controlling shareholder tender
offers is not much of a threat. To begin, the threat of being left behind as a
member of a smaller minority is largely illusory-Utilicorp and Unocal
announced short-form mergers immediately upon acquiring 90 percent of
Aquila and Pure Resources. 14 As noted above, 115 increasing your controlling
stake above 90 percent only makes sense if you plan to proceed promptly with
the squeezeout. Otherwise you are giving up a relatively cheap source of capital
and increasing risk for a very limited return. Moreover, the Delaware appraisal
statute gives a strong incentive to complete the merger promptly. Under Cede
& Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 116 minority shareholders are entitled to any post-
tender offer increases in the value of the company. Controlling shareholders
who delay a short-form merger will be required to share the value of any
changes they make in the subsidiary's operations. Furthermore, only
controlling shareholders who believe that the subsidiary's value will increase
have an incentive to make an offer at all. Thus, waiting to complete the short-
form merger will increase the prospect that the minority shareholders will seek
appraisal. The controlling shareholder would prefer to avoid having any
shareholders seek that remedy because of the expense and distraction of having
to defend in the appraisal proceeding. It is the litigation costs, rather than the
risk of a higher payout to a small minority, that provide appraisal with its real
deterrent value-and give corresponding credibility to the threat of minority
shareholders not tendering.
This line of reasoning also suggests why a lower offer in the short-form
111. See Unocal Increases Exchange Ratio of Exchange Offer for Pure Resources Shares, PR
NEWSWIRE, Oct. 30, 2002, (reporting number of shares tendered); PURE RESOURCES DEFINITIVE 14A,
Apr. 12, 2002, (reporting 50,206,597 total shares outstanding).
112. See Utilicorp Completes Aquila Merger, POWER MARKETS WEEK, Jan. 14, 2002, at 15.
113- See, e.g., Tyson Freeman, Son of Siliconix, CORP. CONTROL ALERT, Oct. 23, 2002, (reporting
that Network Associates tender offer for McAfee yielded only 4 percent of outstanding shares after
Network Associates had raised bid five times; sixth bid resulted in endorsement by McAfee independent
directors and success of tender offer); Reuters, Motorola increases its bid for Next Level, Companies
agree on $1.18 per share, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Mar. 25, 2003, at C3, (reporting that Motorola was forced
to increase its bid after tenders under original offer did not meet minimum condition).
114. Utilicorp Completes Aquila Merger, POWER MARKETS WEEK, Jan. 14, 2002; Unocal
Successful in Exchange Offer for Pure Resources, PR NEWSWIRE, Oct. 30, 2002.
115. See supra Part I.B.4.
116. 684 A.2d 289 (Del. 1996).
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merger following the tender offer is exceedingly unlikely. What could be more
of a red flag to a minority shareholder considering his or her appraisal option?
Apart from these rather tenuous implicit threats, if the controlling
shareholder makes an actual threat to induce the minority to tender, or a
structurally coercive offer, those threats are actionable coercion under
Solomon.117 And virtually all such threats will be litigated because they are
necessarily conspicuous-the threat is ineffective if the public shareholders are
not made aware of it. In sum, the specter of coercion is just that, a specter.
B. Fair Price
Commentators have also complained that the Solomon/Glassman regime
deprives minority shareholders of the bargaining leverage afforded by the entire
fairness regime. I1 Only a special committee of independent directors with the
power to "say no" will ensure that minority shareholders get the best price for
their shares.' 19
One would question, however, whether the best price is the fair price for
minority shareholders. Wealth transfers in this essentially self-contained, multi-
period bilateral negotiation between majority and minority hardly present a
compelling case for legal intervention. As noted above,' 20  minority
shareholders generally did not acquire their minority status by accident. They
invested in a public offering by a controlling shareholder, in which case the risk
of "unfair" expropriation was incorporated into the price that they paid for their
shares. Alternatively, they had the opportunity to sell their shares pro rata into
a tender offer by which the controlling shareholder obtained control, in which
case they shared in the control premium paid by the controlling shareholder.
Should the controlling shareholder have to pay a second control premium, in
this case a "complete control" premium?
Such a regime would reduce the number of transactions seeking control, a
result unlikely to benefit investors ex ante. Remember that minority
shareholders are not discrete and insular minorities: the minority shareholder of
the subsidiary may well be part of a diffuse public majority of the parent
corporation. Certainly, if they hold a diversified portfolio, they can expect to be
117. See Jon E. Abramczyk et al., Going-Private "Dilemma "?-Not in Delaware, 58 Bus, LAW.
1351, 1363 (2003) ("[T]he court's insistence that there be no threat of retribution reaffirms the long-
standing practice of Delaware courts to scrutinize carefully whether there is any actionable coercion in
tender offers made by controlling stockholders.").
118. Brian M. Resnick, Recent Delaware Decisions May Prove to Be "Entirely Unfair" to Minority
Shareholders in Parent Merger with Partially Owned Subsidiary, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 253;
Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 785
(2003).
119. See Resnick, supra note 118 at 261 (arguing that "adequate procedures are important to
ensuring that minority shareholders get the best price, not just a fair price").
120. See supra Part I1.
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on the parent side as often as the subsidiary side. If this is the case, requiring
subsidiary boards to extract the largest possible premium would simply create
greater transaction costs, with minimal benefits for public shareholders.
121
This argument, however, may prove too much-investors are just as likely
to be shareholders in acquiring corporations as they are target corporations, but
that has not kept the Delaware Supreme Court from approving a regime of
defensive measures that allows target company boards to extract all of the
available rents from hostile acquirers. The court has specifically rejected a
model of director passivity in response to outside tender offers.' 22 Indeed,
Revlon essentially mandates that a target board which has made the decision to
sell must extract every last dollar for its shareholders.' 23 Why not expect as
much from the boards of controlled corporations?
The analogy to Delaware's regime for third-party tender offers is central to
Ron Gilson and Jeff Gordon's criticism of the SolomonlGlassman regime. Like
Vice-Chancellor Strine, they seize upon the language in Unocal suggesting that
target directors have "both the power and duty to oppose a bid it perceived to
be harmful to the corporate enterprise."' 24 This "power and duty" subsequently
was held to include the power to adopt a poison pill in Moran v. Household
International.125 In Gilson and Gordon's view, the target board passivity
approved in Siliconix, Aquila, and Pure Resources raises a "troubling
inconsistency in Delaware law: that minority shareholders of a controlled
company receive less protection when faced with a hostile 'internal' tender
offer than shareholders faced with a hostile 'external' tender offer.' ' 126 Gilson
and Gordon claim that if target directors "have the right to prevent the
shareholders from choosing to accept a hostile tender offer by declining to
redeem a pill, there is no coherent case for not demanding that target directors
confronting a freeze-out tender offer have available the same power."
'l27
Gilson and Gordon's claim turns on whether the duty to rebuff hostile
tender offers recognized in Unocal sweeps as broadly as the power also
recognized there and expanded in subsequent cases. I have my doubts. Recall
that the offer rebuffed in Unocal involved two-tiered consideration, with cash
121. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 209 (1991) ("Courts shape the corporate contract, and legal rules influence the wealth
of invesors who may hold stock in bidders, targets, bystanders, or (most likely) all three groups.
Robbing Peter to pay Paul is poor use of corporate law, especially when Peter is just Paul's nom de
plume.").
122. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 n.10 (Del. 1985) (observing that
Easterbrook and Fischel's argument for passivity "clearly is not the law of Delaware").
123. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
124. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 118, at 38 (quoting Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1985) (emphasis supplied by Gilson & Gordon)).
125. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
126. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 118, at 55.
127. Id. at 59.
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at the front end and highly subordinated securities at the back end., 28 The
coercion in such an offer is apparent: tender and get the cash, or refuse, and risk
getting the junk bonds instead. As such, it was what the Delaware Supreme
Court would later come to term "structurally coercive."
' 129
The modifier "structurally" was necessary to distinguish a second category
of threat that the target board had the power to defend against: "substantive
coercion." Substantive coercion describes "the risk that shareholders will
mistakenly accept an underpriced offer because they disbelieve management's
representations of intrinsic value." 130 Although the coercion in "structural
coercion" is fairly clear (making the case for judicial intervention
correspondingly straightforward), the use of the word coercion in connection
with the price offered in a voluntary tender offer for shares is at least odd, and,
some might say, an abuse of the English language. Most observers would agree
that the risk of erroneous shareholder tendering is slight, particularly if the
target directors are afforded an opportunity to explain why the unwelcome offer
does not reflect the target's intrinsic value. t3 1 Investors, particularly the
institutional investors who are likely to hold the balance of power in most
takeover battles, are not in the business of throwing money away. Greed is a
powerful incentive to see things clearly. There may be a threat here, but it
scarcely rises to the level of coercion-perhaps "confusion," at most.
Surely, the members of the Delaware Supreme Court know this, despite the
rhetoric of "substantive coercion." Gilson and Gordon are correct that there
appears to be a "sharp disconnect" between Solomon's affirmation of the
shareholders' right to consider tender offers by controlling shareholders, as
long as they are not infected by "actionable coercion" and the rhetoric of
"substantive coercion" employed in the court's review of anti-takeover
128. Unocal, 493 A.2d 946, 949. The court also cited the risk of two-tier tender offers when it
subsequently approved the use of poison pills as a defensive measure. See Moran v. Household
International, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985) ("Household has adequately demonstrated, as
explained above, that the adoption of the Rights Plan was in reaction to what it perceived to be the threat
in the market place of coercive two-tier tender offers.").
129. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 n.l7 (Del. 1990).
130. Id.
131. A Delaware chancellor, for example, stated:
[D1ne of corporate management's functions is to ensure that the market recognizes the value
of the company and that the stockholders are apprised of relevant information about the
company. This informational responsibility would include, one would think, the duty to
communicate the company's strategic plans and prospects to stockholders as clearly and
understandably as possible. If management claims that its communication efforts have been
unsuccessful, shouldn't it have to show that its efforts were adequate before using the risk of
confusion as a reason to deny its stockholders access to a bid offering a substantial premium to
the company's market price?
Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293 (Del. Ch. 2000). See also Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural
Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV.
819, 865-67 (1981) (advocating limiting defensive tactics to the amount of time necessary to allow
management to convey information to shareholders); Ronald J. Gilson, Lipton and Rowe's Apologia for
Delaware: A Short Reply, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 37 (2002) (reaffirming earlier position).
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defenses. 132 However, the Delaware Supreme Court may treat these seemingly
similarly situated shareholders differently because the two contexts raise
distinct policy concerns. Perhaps the threat of "substantive coercion" is not
really a threat to shareholders, but instead, to another constituency entirely.
To see what might be at work, we need to look past the rhetoric of the
court's anti-takeover jurisprudence to the substance of the rules that it actually
applies. Specifically, what are the limits of the board's power to hide behind a
poison pill and thereby preclude shareholder consideration of a third-party
tender offer? After wading through a lot of cases, we find two situations in
which the pill must be redeemed: 1) when the company has put itself up for
sale, thereby invoking Revlon duties, and 2) when an insurgent has prevailed in
a proxy battle to replace the incumbent board that has been resisting. Outside
these two areas, the target board's power to resist an offer is subject only to
Unocal's proportionality review, which is to say, essentially unconstrained.1
33
The board can "just say no" to an unwanted takeover. Looking at these rules as
applied, rather than taking judicial rhetoric at face value, may give us a better
sense of the actual policy concerns in play.
Recognizing when a board has put a company up for sale, and thus
subjected the directors' conduct to the exacting scrutiny of the Revlon standard,
is not simple. Is a company for sale when it agrees to merge with another
company? The answer to this question, we found out in Time-Warner, is
generally no. 13 4 The triggering event for the Revlon duty to maximize value for
shareholders became clear in QVC135: a change in control of the corporation.
Why is control the central focus?
When a majority of a corporation's voting shares are acquired by a single person or
entity, or by a cohesive group acting together, there is a significant diminution in
the voting power of those who thereby become minority shareholders.... In the
absence of devices protecting the minority stockholders, stockholder votes are
likely to become mere formalities where there is a majority stockholder. For
example, minority stockholders can be deprived of a continuing equity interest in
their corporation by means of a cash-out merger. Absent effective protective
provisions, minority stockholders must rely for protection solely on the fiduciary
duties owed to them by the directors and the majority stockholder, since the
minority stockholders have lost the power to influence corporate direction through
the ballot. The acquisition of majority status and the consequent privilege of
exerting the powers of majority ownership come at a price. That price is usually a
132. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 118, at 39.
133. See Robert H. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder Role:
"Sacred Space" in Corporate Takeovers, 80 TEx. L. REv. 261, 284 (2001) (arguing that Unocal is
"incapable of policing management entrenchment"). Unocal review may have some bite where the board
agrees to an offer and the agreement entirely precludes the shareholder's consideration of an alternative
offer. See Onmicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003) (enjoining merger
agreement for which shareholder vote was a "fait accompli").
134. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152 (Del. 1990) (rejecting
argument that Time had put itself up for sale by agreeing to combination with Warner).
135. Paramount Communications v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
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control premium which recognizes not only the value of a control block of shares,
but also compensates the minority stockholders for their resulting loss of voting136power.
Control can be sold, but a price must be paid to compensate the
shareholders for the voting authority that they are yielding when they consent
to the transaction. The transfer of control-and the fiduciary obligations that
accompany it-is tied to the power conferred by the shareholder vote.
Less obvious, but of equal importance, the question of control is
inextricably intertwined with the protections of the business judgment rule for
directors. If control is to change hands, the target company directors' business
judgment is entitled to considerably less deference. The QVC court explained:
"Irrespective of the present Paramount Board's visions of a long-term strategic
alliance with Viacom, the proposed sale of control would provide the new
controlling stockholder with the power to alter that vision." 137 The business
judgment rule preserves the discretion of the directors to take risks in making
business decisions against the threat of second guessing by judges. Defenses
against takeover are tools to protect the business judgment of the directors from
second guessing by market participants. When the board has ceded the
authority to implement its judgment, however, it loses the protection of the
business judgment rule.' 38 Once the board has conceded that it is no longer the
best custodian of the corporation's assets, the board has a duty to extract the
best price for the public shareholders who will be giving up control.
The other takeover context in which the board can also lose the protection
of the business judgment rule is when its defense against a takeover conflicts
with the shareholders' exercise of their franchise. Under the Blasius standard,
the business judgment rule gives way when board discretion conflicts with the
shareholder's vote because "[t]he shareholder franchise is the ideological
underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests."' 39 By
contrast, defensive measures adopted with shareholder approval are not
subjected to any form of enhanced scrutiny, even the toothless Unocal
variety.
140
These rules are not purely the product of common-law evolution; statutory
rules are fundamental here. Director primacy over the corporation's direction is
136. Id. at42.
137. Id. at43.
138. From this perspective, the QVC rule has a similar import to the rule of Smith v, Van Gorkom,
488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), which denied the protections of the business judgment rule to directors who
had made an uninformed judgment.
139. Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988). See also Unitrin, Inc. v.
American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1379 (1995) (recognizing that takeover defenses that interfere
with the shareholder franchise implicate both Unocal and Blasius).
140. Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1377 (Del. 1996) ("A Unocal analysis should be used only
when a board unilaterally (i.e., without stockholder approval) adopts a defensive measure in reaction to a
perceived threat.").
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mandated by § 141 (a), which directs that the corporation's business and affairs
"shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors."'14' That
power, however, is subject to the shareholder's overarching authority to replace
the board through the electoral process, as recognized in § 141 (k). 42
This quick overview hardly does justice to the nuances of Delaware's
antitakeover jurisprudence, but for the purposes of this Article, it is the broad
principles that count. As a descriptive matter, the interrelated pieces of the
Delaware Supreme Court's antitakeover jurisprudence can perhaps best be seen
as maintaining director supremacy over the business and affairs of the
corporation. 43 Directors call the shots, limited only by the shareholders' ability
to select who the directors will be: if the shareholders are unhappy with the job
that the directors are doing, they can throw the bums out,' 44 but only through
the electoral process. One can quarrel with the wisdom of this policy choice
favoring proxy fights over tender offers (perhaps one should put more faith in
the ability of investors to balance short-terms gains against long-term ones), 145
but director supremacy constrained by electoral accountability seems to reflect
the actual practice of the Delaware Supreme Court in deciding cases.
Furthermore, one cannot dismiss the theory underlying this director supremacy
model as simply foolish. 146 For better or worse, the Delaware Supreme Court's
Unocal doctrine allows directors to protect themselves against second-guessing
of their business judgment by the marketplace.
141. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a). See also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del.
1985) ("Under Delaware law, the business judgment rule is the offspring of the fundamental principle,
codified in 8 Del. C. § 141(a), that the business and affairs of a Delaware corporation are managed by or
under its board of directors.").
142. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) ("Any director or the entire board of directors may be
removed, with or without cause, by the holders of a majority of the shares then entitled to vote at an
election of directors ....").
143. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 547-606 (2003) (outlining model of director primacy).
144. One Delaware court elaborated:
Maintaining proper balance in the allocation of power between the stockholders' right to elect
directors and the board of directors' right to manage the corporation is dependent upon the
stockholders' unimpeded right to vote effectively in an election of directors. This Court has
repeatedly stated that, if the stockholders are not satisfied with the management or actions of
their elected representatives on the board of directors, the power of corporate democracy is
available to the stockholders to replace the incumbent directors when they stand for re-
election.
MM Companies, Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003).
145. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U.
CH. L. REv. 975, 977-81 (2002) (arguing that boards should not be permitted to block noncoercive
offers); Ronald J. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later (And What We Can Do About It), 26 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 491, 507-09 (2001) (arguing that the shareholders should decide whether to accept or reject a
bid for control),
146. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill:
Adaptive Response to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 871 (2002); Martin Lipton, Pills, Polls, and
Professors Redux, 69 U. CI. L. REv. 1037, 1064-66 (2002) (arguing that the decision whether to accept
or reject an acquisition offer was primarily for the board of directors).
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How do these broad principles apply to tender offers by controlling
shareholders? Can one reconcile the seeming conflict between the passive role
for the board endorsed in Solomon and the active auctioneering role mandated
by Revlon (as more fully explicated by QVC? The focus on control provides
the key. Control will not shift as a result of a tender offer by the controlling
shareholder; the controlling shareholder will enjoy the same level of authority
over the corporate enterprise whether the offer succeeds or fails. Consequently,
there is no threat to the business judgment of the board-the board's business
judgment is already subject to the overarching authority of the controlling
shareholder. The board has no duty to extract a premium because control has
already shifted (through the earlier tender offer by which the controlling
shareholder gained control) or was never yielded (because it was retained at the
IPO stage). In addition, interference with the shareholder franchise is not
implicated because the power reflected by that franchise is held-quite
lawfully-by the controlling shareholder. The board of the controlled
subsidiary has no duty to adopt a poison pill because there is no threat to the
control of the subsidiary.
Gordon and Gilson counter by asking "why should the board's duty to
protect shareholders be lower when the threat is the misuse of control than
when the threat is an unfavorable transfer of control?"' 147 Characterizing the
controlling shareholder's efforts to freeze out the minority as "misuse,"
however, begs the question. Simply put, controlling shareholders have rights
too. 148 Controlling shareholders owe the corporation a fiduciary duty, but that
duty does not require self-sacrifice. 149 Anyone can make an offer for the shares
held by the minority, so why should a controlling shareholder be disabled from
doing the same? The corporate machinery is not implicated. More to the point,
if the shareholders of a company that is owned by a diffuse public majority
have the power to replace the board of directors with one that will redeem the
pill, why should a controlling shareholder be disabled from doing the same?
The board has limited authority to interfere with the prerogatives of a
controlling shareholder. According to Chancellor Allen:
The board's fiduciary obligation to the corporation and its shareholders, in this
setting, requires it to be a protective guardian of the rightful interest of the public
shareholders. But while obligation may authorize the board to take extraordinary
steps to protect the minority from plain overreaching, it does not authorize the board
to deploy corporate power against the majority stockholders, in the absence of a
threatened serious breach of fiduciary duty by the controlling stock[holder].15
0
147. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 118, at 39 n.80.
148. Mendel v. Carroll, 651 A.2d 297, 307 (Del. Ch. 1994) (stating that issue of option that would
have diluted majority stockholder's interest would have breached board's fiduciary duty to controlling
stockholder).
149. Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584 (Del. Ch. 1986).
150. Mendel, 651 A.2d at 306. See also Freedman v. Restaurant Associates Industries, 1987 WL
14323, at *9 (Del. Ch. 1987) ("I take it to be established in our law that it would ordinarily be found to
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The controlling shareholder is within its rights in vetoing the sale of the
subsidiary to a third party,' 51 and no one thinks that this veto is subject to entire
fairness review.' 52 The tender offer does not require the minority shareholders
to give up any entitlement (they are free to-and they do-decline to tender).
The possibility of a follow-on short-form merger is explicitly authorized by
statute. Consequently, it would be odd to characterize either step of the
transaction as misuse, much less the "serious breach of fiduciary duty by the
controlling stockholder required to justify action against the controlling
shareholder."' 53 Thus, the only apparent "threat" here is that the minority
shareholders will be unable to extract a second control premium from the
controlling shareholder. That is hardly a cognizable threat, however, in light of
the fact that control already stands with the controlling shareholder, rendering a
duty to auction under Revlon clearly inapplicable. Consequently, "substantive"
coercion drops out of the picture, leaving only "structural" coercion, which is
termed "actionable" coercion in the Solomon progeny. Competently advised
controlling shareholders will rarely make the mistake of threats that rise to the
level of "structural" or "actionable" coercion because they know that courts
will step in to protect minority shareholders.
CONCLUSION
The structure of corporate law, as developed by the Delaware legislature
and courts, places only limited duties on the boards of subsidiaries when
confronted with a tender offer from the controlling shareholder. It is sufficient
for the board of the controlled company to protect the property and statutory
rights of the subsidiary and provide minority shareholders with information to
make an intelligent choice on whether to tender. The board has a role to play,
as part of its duty of candor, to keep the minority informed, especially if a
merger is to follow, so that the shareholders can evaluate their appraisal option.
It is not unreasonable to ask that those directors serve as information agents for
the diffuse public minority, a role that will help the shareholders make their
constitute an abuse of power for a board of directors to issue stock, not for the principal purpose of
raising necessary or desirable capital, but for the sole or primary purpose of diluting the voting power of
an existing block of stock."); Canada Southern Oils, Ltd. v. Manabi Exploration Co., 96 A.2d 810, 814
(Del. Ch. 1953) ("[M]ajority voting control is a right which a court of equity will protect."); Condec
Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 230 A.2d 769, 775 (Del. Ch. 1967) ("It is a breach of [fiduciary] duty,
wholly apart from any consideration of pre-emptive rights, for directors to make use of the issuance of
shares to accomplish an improper purpose, such as to enable a particular person or group to maintain or
obtain voting control, against the objections of shareholders from whom control is thereby wrested.").
151. Thorpe v. Cerbco, Inc., 676 A.2d 436 (Del. 1996).
152. Cf Next Level Communications, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 2003 WL 549083, at *19 (Del. Ch.
2003) (tender offer by controlling shareholder did not require it to waive contractual rights against
subsidiary).
153. Mendel, 651 A.2d at 306.
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ability to refuse to tender a real constraint on controlling shareholders.15 4
A broader role for the subsidiary board, however, is not justified under
Delaware corporate law. Controlling shareholders have already paid their
control premium once, either explicitly in the form of a premium by which they
obtained their control bloc, or implicitly in the form of a discount in an equity
carveout. Control premia are not an end in themselves; they are a price to be
paid for second-guessing the business judgment of an incumbent board and
nullifying the voting authority of minority shareholders. Controlling
shareholders are second-guessing only themselves, and the minority
shareholders have either long since lost, or never had, effective voting power.
Tender offers by controlling shareholders pose an inevitable policy
tradeoff: additional protection to minority shareholders (beyond their ability to
refuse to tender) against the costs imposed by more lawsuits. Courts have a
role to play in policing against structurally coercive offers and retributive
threats. But judicial intervention beyond that narrow scope is less clearly
desirable. Whereas the Weinberger/Kahn regime strikes a balance on the side
of shareholder protection, the Solomon/Glassman regime strikes a balance in
favor of minimizing transaction and litigation costs. The real costs, if any, of
that streamlined procedure come in the form of diminished willingness of
investors to participate in partial equity carveouts, or greater concerns for target
boards in responding to offers for a controlling bloc, but not all, of the
company's shares. If this happens, investment bankers can no doubt devise
appropriate protections for minority shareholders against expropriation by
freeze-out. The bankers can even duplicate the procedural hurdles of the entire
fairness regime, if anyone wants that. The costs of the entire fairness regime, by
contrast, are unavoidable, with lots of money going to lawyers and investment
bankers for their services in ensuring the "fairness" of freeze-out transactions,
with more money going to lawyers to prosecute and defend the inevitable class
actions to challenge the "fairness" of those transactions. It would be a mistake
to bring those costs back to freeze-out transactions in the name of doctrinal
purity. The Delaware courts have a long history of working their way around
cumbersome procedures and the Solomon/Glassman alternative squeeze-out
procedure simply adds another chapter to that story.
154. Robin Sidel, Takeover Targets Force up Offers in 'Minority Squeeze-Out' Deals, WALL ST. J.,
May 10, 2002, at C3 (reporting successes of special committees in extracting higher bids from
controlling shareholders).
